Healthcare organizations need to protect a growing application attack surface while showing that risks to electronic protected health information (ePHI) are identified and managed. More than 276 million healthcare records were affected by reported breaches in 2024, and the average healthcare breach cost reached $7.42 million in 2025. Yet network scanners cannot test whether patient portals and FHIR APIs enforce access controls correctly. Automated dynamic application security testing (DAST) helps close that gap by testing running applications and APIs, supporting remediation, retesting, and HIPAA-aligned evidence.

The current HIPAA Security Rule does not require a specific scanning product or define a universal scanning frequency. Its security management process under 45 CFR §164.308(a)(1) requires covered entities and business associates to:
The periodic evaluation standard under §164.308(a)(8) also requires technical and non-technical evaluations in response to environmental or operational changes that affect ePHI security.
HHS describes risk analysis as the first step in identifying and implementing safeguards under the Security Rule. The rule applies to ePHI created, received, maintained, or transmitted by covered entities and business associates.
For application security, this means understanding the risks introduced by the systems that process ePHI, not only the infrastructure hosting them. Relevant questions include:
DAST can provide evidence about many observable application behaviors. It does not evaluate every administrative, physical, or technical safeguard required by HIPAA.
The proposed HIPAA update attracts attention because it would introduce explicit scanning and testing requirements. Current enforcement provides the more immediate reason to improve application security.
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has repeatedly used its Risk Analysis Initiative to address failures to conduct accurate and thorough risk analysis. In April 2026, OCR announced four ransomware settlements that brought the initiative to 13 completed investigations. A June 2026 settlement with an employer-sponsored health plan marked its 14th enforcement action under the initiative.
These actions reinforce the need to show that an organization:
An inventory limited to servers, operating systems, and network devices may overlook applications and APIs that expose ePHI to users and partner systems. A scan report with no assigned owner, remediation record, or retest result also provides little evidence that the organization managed the identified risk.
For security leaders, the goal is broader than scheduling scans. It is establishing a traceable process from asset identification through testing, remediation, verification, and reporting.
HHS announced a proposed update to the HIPAA Security Rule on December 27, 2024. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in the Federal Register on January 6, 2025. As of July 2026, the proposal is not final and its provisions are not enforceable as current law.
If finalized as written, it would introduce requirements including:
HHS lists the scanning and penetration-testing requirements in its NPRM fact sheet.
The OMB Unified Agenda entry for RIN 0945-AA22 places the rule under long-term actions and lists July 2027 as the projected date for final action. That is a planning estimate, not a binding deadline. The proposal could change, be delayed further, or be withdrawn.
Healthcare organizations should prepare for more prescriptive requirements without describing them as current obligations.
Infrastructure vulnerability scanners examine operating systems, network services, installed packages, protocols, and configurations. They help find missing patches, known software vulnerabilities, exposed ports, and weak network settings.
DAST interacts with a running web application or API. It examines requests, responses, sessions, parameters, authentication flows, and application behavior. The two forms of testing are complementary:
A healthcare security program generally needs both infrastructure and application-layer visibility. Running one does not substitute for the other.
Start with an inventory of applications and APIs that store, process, transmit, or provide access to ePHI.
Patient portals expose lab results, medications, clinical notes, appointments, messages, billing information, and uploaded documents. Testing should cover:
Third-party tracking is a useful example of an application-layer data-flow problem. In April 2025, Blue Shield of California disclosed that Google Analytics had been configured in a way that allowed certain member data to be shared with Google Ads. The potentially affected data included insurance information, claim details, patient financial responsibility, and provider-search criteria.
That type of exposure is not caused by a missing operating system patch. It arises from how an application, its pages, and third-party components process and transmit information.
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) APIs are a mainstream part of healthcare interoperability. The ONC Health IT Certification Program’s standardized API criterion references FHIR, SMART App Launch, US Core, OpenID Connect, and bulk-data standards.
FHIR APIs can expose resources containing:
Testing should examine authentication, scope enforcement, object-level authorization, input handling, data minimization, and bulk access.
A common risk is broken object level authorization (BOLA). An API may confirm that a requester is authenticated but fail to verify access to a specific resource. As an example, take a request based only on a resource ID:
GET /Observation/123If a patient can change the resource identifier and retrieve another patient’s result, the API has crossed an authorization boundary and possibly has a BOLA vulnerability.
Testing this scenario requires controlled accounts, known test data, and separate authenticated contexts. The tester needs to compare what Patient A can access against what Patient B can access. The same principle applies to clinicians, administrators, and partner applications.
Electronic health record environments connect to laboratories, pharmacies, billing platforms, imaging systems, decision-support tools, and other services. These integrations may include:
Testing should verify authentication, authorization, input handling, data minimization, and exposed legacy functionality. Discovery matters because deployed endpoints do not always match current documentation.
Healthcare payment applications may handle both ePHI and payment card information. Security teams should define which components fall within HIPAA and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) scope, then test the application and API paths that cross those boundaries.
Business associate portals and integrations can expose claims, billing records, clinical data, or patient communications. Covered entities should distinguish between:
The goal is to establish responsibility, evidence, and coverage across the full ePHI data flow – not to test a third party without permission.
A useful program connects five activities: inventory, testing, prioritization, remediation, and evidence.
For each asset, record:
Automated discovery can help identify unknown websites, APIs, and services. Results still require validation and ownership assignment.
Testing depth and frequency should reflect:
These are program-design examples, not HIPAA requirements. Each organization should document why its cadence is reasonable for the asset and risk.
Public scans cover only the unauthenticated surface. Most ePHI functionality sits behind login, OAuth tokens, identity providers, and role-specific permissions. Authenticated testing may require:
Authorization testing should include multiple controlled identities where practical. A single authenticated session cannot show whether an application correctly separates two patients or two provider roles.
A useful finding should identify:
Prioritization should account for reachability, exploitability, ePHI exposure, business criticality, and compensating controls rather than relying on severity scores alone.
Closing a ticket does not verify that the deployed application is fixed. A defensible record connects:
Application security documentation may include policies, risk-analysis inputs, scan reports, remediation records, exceptions, and evaluation evidence.
A useful application security evidence package should answer four questions.
Record the applications and APIs tested, their ePHI classification, the environment, authentication status, roles covered, exclusions, and testing limitations.
Retain the scan date and policy, affected assets, vulnerability details, application context, available verification evidence, and any duplicate or false-positive decisions.
Show ownership, remediation deadlines, corrective actions, accepted-risk decisions, compensating controls, retest results, and closure dates.
Useful operational measures include:
The total number of findings is not a reliable security metric by itself. More findings may reflect better coverage rather than a worsening security posture.
DAST provides repeatable coverage across applications and releases. Penetration testers apply human reasoning to complex business logic, chained attack paths, architectural weaknesses, and unusual abuse cases.
DAST is well suited to recurring vulnerability testing, broad web and API coverage, regression testing, workflow integration, structured reporting, and retesting. Penetration testing adds depth for business logic, chained exploits, trust boundaries, and complex authorization models.
A mature program uses both. The proposed HIPAA update reflects this distinction by listing vulnerability scanning and penetration testing as separate activities.
The Invicti Application Security Platform helps healthcare organizations discover, test, prioritize, manage, and remediate vulnerabilities across web applications and APIs.
Its DAST-first approach starts with the behavior of running applications. This gives security leaders an outside-in view of vulnerabilities exposed through deployed functionality, independent of the languages and frameworks used to build the application.
Effective coverage depends on appropriate scope, authentication, roles, and test data. Complex clinical permissions and business logic may still require manual assessment.
Invicti combines web application and API discovery with automated security testing. Teams can use discovery to identify known and previously untracked assets, validate ownership, and bring more of the application attack surface into a consistent testing process.
Authenticated scanning extends testing beyond public pages to protected portal functions and API endpoints. Relevant healthcare targets can include:
For authorization testing, teams can configure controlled patient, provider, or administrative identities and use authenticated workflows to assess whether protected functions and API resources remain separated between roles. This provides the application context needed to investigate object-level authorization weaknesses that infrastructure scanners cannot evaluate.
Automated scanners can create significant manual work when findings lack reliable verification. For supported vulnerability classes, Invicti’s proof-based scanning can safely confirm exploitability and attach evidence to the finding. For a supported injection vulnerability, for example, the result can include the request, test payload, and application response that confirmed the issue.
This gives developers a reproducible starting point for remediation and helps security teams separate confirmed application risk from findings that still need investigation.
Not every vulnerability can or should be automatically exploited – but where verification is available, it reduces reproduction work and improves remediation confidence.
Invicti integrates application testing with CI/CD systems, issue trackers, and development workflows. Teams can use these integrations to trigger appropriate scans, route findings, track remediation, and retest fixes.
This helps turn application security from an isolated assessment activity into a repeatable operating process.
Invicti ASPM centralizes findings across application security tools, correlates and deduplicates results, applies risk-based prioritization, and provides consolidated visibility. For healthcare security leaders, that helps answer practical questions:
Invicti provides built-in HIPAA compliance reporting that organizes relevant technical findings against HIPAA-related requirements. These reports can help teams:
A HIPAA report does not certify compliance. It supplies structured technical evidence that the organization can combine with policies, risk decisions, access reviews, incident records, workforce controls, and other required documentation.
Patient portals and FHIR APIs expose application behaviors that infrastructure scanners cannot evaluate. Healthcare security leaders need a repeatable way to test those systems, prioritize meaningful risk, verify fixes, and preserve evidence.
The current HIPAA Security Rule already requires risk analysis, reasonable and appropriate safeguards, periodic evaluation, and documentation. OCR enforcement already focuses on whether organizations identify and manage risks to ePHI.
Invicti brings together application and API discovery, DAST, remediation workflows, ASPM, and HIPAA-oriented reporting to help healthcare teams make application risk visible and manageable.
The current HIPAA Security Rule does not prescribe automated scanning by name or define a fixed frequency. It requires covered entities and business associates to identify risks and vulnerabilities to electronic protected health information (ePHI) and implement reasonable and appropriate safeguards. Automated scanning is one way to support those activities.
No. HHS announced the proposal on December 27, 2024, and published it in the Federal Register on January 6, 2025. As of July 2026, no final rule has been issued. The OMB Unified Agenda lists July 2027 as the projected date for final action, but the timing and final requirements could still change.
The current rule does not set a universal frequency. Organizations should document a risk-based cadence based on exposure, ePHI sensitivity, release frequency, previous findings, architecture changes, and operational impact. If finalized as written, the proposed rule would require vulnerability scanning at least once every six months.
OCR expects organizations to identify systems that store, process, or transmit ePHI, assess relevant risks and vulnerabilities, implement safeguards, document remediation or accepted-risk decisions, and reassess controls after material changes or security incidents.
Network scanners primarily identify weaknesses in hosts, services, software packages, and configurations. Dynamic application security testing (DAST) tests running application behavior, including input handling, sessions, authentication flows, and API requests.
Broken object level authorization (BOLA) occurs when an API authenticates a requester but fails to verify access to a specific resource. In healthcare, that could allow one patient or provider to retrieve another patient’s ePHI by changing a resource identifier.
Automated DAST can support authentication, scope, and object-level authorization testing when configured with suitable accounts, tokens, roles, and test data. Complex consent models, delegated access, and clinical business logic may still require manual testing.
No. A scan report provides technical evidence from a security assessment. HIPAA compliance also depends on governance, policies, workforce controls, access management, incident response, business associate oversight, documentation, and other safeguards.
No. DAST provides repeatable, automated coverage across applications and releases. Penetration testing adds human reasoning for complex business logic, chained attacks, trust-boundary analysis, and unusual abuse cases. A mature application security program uses both.
Invicti supports application and API discovery, authenticated DAST, proof-based verification for supported vulnerabilities, remediation workflows, centralized risk visibility through Invicti ASPM, and built-in HIPAA-oriented reporting. These capabilities support a broader HIPAA security and risk-management program rather than replacing it.
