Dolibarr Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) Vulnerability - CVE-2026-81730
Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the messages MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds filepath path . filename . . . ext and hands it to file_put_contents() and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to destdir./.filename the name reaches both from the attachments own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors which is the modules ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarrs SECURITY.md requires with htdocs read-only the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects documents where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.